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ABSTRACT
The growing reliance on online services accessible on the Internet demands 
highly reliable system that would not be interrupted when encountering faults. A 
number of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) algorithms have been developed to mask 
the most complicated type of faults — Byzantine faults such as software bugs, 
operator mistakes, and malicious attacks, which are usually the major cause of service 
interruptions. However, it is often difficult to apply these algorithms to practical 
applications because such applications often exhibit sophisticated non-deterministic 
behaviors that the existing BFT algorithms could not cope with. 
In this thesis, we propose a classification of common types of replica non-
determinism with respect to the requirement of achieving Byzantine fault tolerance, 
and describe the design and implementation of the core mechanisms necessary to 
handle such replica nondeterminism within a Byzantine fault tolerance framework. In 
addition, we evaluated the performance of our BFT library, referred to as ND-BFT 
using both a micro-benchmark application and a more realistic online porker game 
application. The performance results show that the replicated online poker game 
performs approximately 13% slower than its nonreplicated counterpart in the presence 
of small number of players.  
iv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The society is increasingly dependent on services provided by computer 
systems and our vulnerability to computer failures is growing as a result: we expect to 
have highly-available systems or applications that should work correctly and provide 
services without interruptions. This requires the system or the application to be 
carefully designed and implemented, and rigorously tested. However, considering the 
intense pressure for short development cycles and the widespread use of commercial-
off-the-shelf software components, it is not surprising that software systems are 
notoriously imperfect. Problems such as software crashing, leaking of confidential 
information, modify or deleting of critical data, or injecting of erroneous information 
into the application data. These malicious faults often referred as Byzantine faults. 
The Byzantine faults can be handled by replicating the server and employing a 
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) algorithm as described in [2, 8, 17, 18].
Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms require the replicas to operate 
deterministically, i.e., given the same input under the same state, all replicas produce 
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the same output and transit to the same state. However, it is incorrect to assume that 
practical applications will operate deterministically. Moreover it is equally incorrect 
to categorize the determinism into a single type. Therefore, when a practical 
application is replicated to tolerate Byzantine fault, its replica nondeterminism must 
be analyzed carefully and be tackled properly to ensure replica consistency.
In previous research, although the replica nondeterminism issue has been 
studied, it is limited to only the most simplistic forms of nondeterminisim, which we 
term as nondeterminism and verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism[2, 8, 17, 
18].  The former assumes that any nondeterministic operations and their side effects 
can be mapped into some pre-specified abstract operations and state, which are 
deterministic. The later assumes that any nondeterministic values can be determined 
prior to the execution of a request, and such values proposed by one replica can be 
verified by other replicas in a deterministic manner, and the values are accepted only 
if they are believed to be correct.
Therefore, new techniques must be carried out to cope with replicated 
applications that exhibit other types of nondeterministic behavior to guarantee replica 
consistency. For example, many online gaming applications contain some kind of 
nondeterminism whose value [4, 14] (e.g., random numbers that determine the state of 
the applications) proposed by one replica cannot be verified by another one. It is 
incorrect to treat this type of replica nondeterminism the same as the verifiable pre-
determinable nondeterminism because a faulty replica could use a predictable 
algorithm to update its internal state and collude with its clients, without being 
detected, which defeats the purpose of Byzantine fault tolerance. As another example, 
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multi-threaded applications may exhibit nondeterminism whose values [13] (e.g., 
thread interleaving) cannot be determined prior to the execution of a request (without 
losing concurrency) which cannot be handled by existing BFT mechanisms.
1.1  Contribution
In this thesis, we introduce a classification of common types of replica non-
determinism present in many applications. We propose a set of mechanisms that can 
be used to control these types of nondeterministic operations. We also describe the 
implementation of the core mechanisms and their integration with a well-known BFT 
framework [18]. More, specifically, we make the following research contributions:
 We provide two types of motivating applications to illustrate the inadequacy 
of current approaches to the problem of replica non-determinism
 We provide a classification of common types of replica nondeterminism for 
both Byzantine fault tolerance and benign fault tolerance.
 We propose a unified framework to ensure consistent Byzantine fault tolerant 
replication for applications exhibiting the nondeterministic behavior we have 
classified. 
 We provide a preliminary implementation of the unified framework based on 
the original BFT framework and report the performance evaluation results of 
our prototype on handling different types of replica non-determinism.
 We propose a alternative technology with better security result, however, the 
performance of this technology is not as good as ND-BFT, thus there is still a 
lot of future research to do on this topic.    
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1.2  Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background 
information. We start by describing BFT and other related techniques that used to 
tolerate Byzantine fault, which is a big picture of what is Byzantine fault and how to 
tolerant it. Chapter 3 describes ND-BFT: we explain the limitation of original BFT, 
and provide a systematic classification of different type of replica nondeterminism. 
The reminder of this chapter describes the corresponding solution for each type of 
replica nondeterminism and the proof of correctness. The implementation of the ND-
BFT library, interface and online poker game that equipped ND-BFT library is 
presented in Chapter 4. The detailed performance analysis for the ND-BFT library and 
online poker game is described in the second half of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses 
related work. Finally, our conclusions and some direction for future work appear on 
Chapter 6.
4
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present the background information including fault 
tolerance, Byzantine fault tolerance and other Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques to 
provide a big picture of the importance for a distributed system to obtain such 
capabilities to tolerate Byzantine fault.
2.1 Fault Tolerance
In this section, we present the basic concept of fault tolerance to show the 
importance for a distributed system to obtain such capability.
Fault tolerance, an important subject in distributed system design, is defined as a 
capability that a system can mask the occurrence and recovery from failures. In other 
words, a fault tolerant system can continue to operate without notice by outside in the 
presence of failure.
A characteristic feature of distributed systems that distinguishes them from 
single-machine system is the notion of partial failure. A partial failure may happen 
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when one component in a distributed system fails. The failure may affect the proper 
operation of other components, while at the same time leaving yet other components 
totally unaffected. In contrast, a failure in non-distributed systems is often going to 
affect all components, and may easily bring down the entire applications.
An important goal in distributed systems design is to construct the system in 
such a way that it can automatically recover from partial failures without seriously 
degrade the overall performance. In particular, whenever a failure occurs, the 
distributed system should continue to operate in an acceptable way whiles repairs are 
being made, that is, it should tolerate faults and continue to operate to some extent.
There are several types of failure exist during the operation as following:
 Crash failure: A process simply halts
 Omission failure: A process does not respond to incoming requests.
 Timing failure: A process responds too sooner or too later to a request.
 Response failure: A process responds a request in a wrong way.
 Byzantine failure: A process exhibits any kind of failure.
Redundancy is the essence to achieve fault tolerance. When applied to 
processes, the notion of process group becomes important. A process group consists 
of several processes that closely cooperate to provide a service. In fault tolerant 
process groups, one or more processes can fail without affecting the availability of the 
services. Often, it is necessary that communication within the group be highly 
reliable, and adheres to stringent ordering and atomicity properties to achieve fault 
tolerance which is often referred as reliable group communication, or reliable multi-
casting.
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2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
2.2.1 Byzantine Fault
A Byzantine fault is an arbitrary fault that occurs during the operation by a 
distributed system. When a Byzantine failure occurs, the system may respond in any 
unpredictable way which exhibits in real world environment as computers and 
networks behaves in unexpected ways due to hardware failures, software errors, 
network congestion and disconnection, as well as malicious attacks. Those problems 
become increasing crucial nowadays,. because people are increasingly depending on 
online services.
The term “Byzantine faults” was originated from the classic Byzantine 
General's problem[1], which several legions lead by one commander and several 
lieutenants camped outside of the enemy’s castle and wait for commander's 
command. To make sure each lieutenant gets the same command, each lieutenant is 
required to send received command (attack or retreat) to the rest of the lieutenants. 
However, there are one or more traitors; the traitor can be either lieutenant or 
commander himself that they try to confuse other loyal lieutenants by sending 
different commands to them. In that case, a loyal lieutenant may receive conflict 
command and confuse about which one is true. And the campaign would be defeated 
if the majority of the troops do not follow the same command. This problem can be 
solved by the Byzantine Agreement: if there is one traitor, we need at least four 
generals including one commander to make an agreement among the loyal generals. If 
we using this solution in computer world, we can have following conclusion: to 
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tolerate f Byzantine fault, we need 3f+1 replicas. Figure 1 shows the proof of this 
algorithm that for a single Byzantine fault, 4 replicas are needed. (a) If the 
commander (i.e., primary replica) is faulty, he may send conflicting information to its 
lieutenants (i.e., replica replicas). However, the lieutenants can exchange information 
regarding what they heard from the commander and reach the correct decision (attack) 
based on majority voting. (b) On the other hand, if a lieutenant is faulty, he may lie to 
other lieutenants regarding the information he has heard from the commander. Other 
lieutenants can still reach a correct decision based on majority voting. Reducing the 
number of replicas to 3 cannot guarantee an agreement among the correct replicas. 
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Figure 1: Byzantine Agreement (one traitor)
2.2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Byzantine fault tolerance [2, 8, 17, 18], a technique that is able to defend 
against the Byzantine fault. A Byzantine fault tolerant system can reach the same 
group decision regardless of the existence of Byzantine faulty replicas.
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Since distributed applications are often structured in terms of clients and 
servers, each service comprises one or more servers and executes the clients' request. 
The state machine replication technique is a general approach to build a fault-tolerant 
system by replicating the servers and making them to behave identically. The 
replicated servers coordinate the original server to reach an agreement to tolerate 
faults. However, it is not enough for this approach to tolerate complicate Byzantine 
fault.
Therefore, systems that provide critical services must behave correctly in the 
face of Byzantine faults. Correct services in the presence of failures are achieved 
through replications: the services runs t a number replicated servers and as more than 
a third of the servers are non-faulty, the group as a whole continues to behave correct.
Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm, which initial by Castro and Liskov[8], is 
state machine based protocol. A Byzantine faulty replica may use all kinds of 
strategies to prevent the normal operations of the replicated services. In particular, it 
might propagate conflicting information to other replicas or components that it 
interacts with. To tolerate f Byzantine faulty replicas in an asynchronous environment, 
we need to have at least 3f+1 number of replicas. An asynchronous environment is 
one that has no bound on processing times, communication delays, and clock skews. 
Internet applications are often modeled as asynchronous systems. Usually, one server 
is designated as primary and the rest are replicas. The protocol move through a series 
of views, each view is denoted by a view number. The primary for a given view is 
determined based on the view number. Replicas remain in the current view unless the 
primary is suspected of being faulty. If the primary behaves in an incorrect or timely 
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way, the other replicas will execute a view change, selecting a new primary by 
internal vote and incrementing the view number and moving to a new view.
BFT algorithm has three communication rounds which is referred as three-
phase protocol in normal case operation as following:
Pre-Prepare     Invoked by the primary after receiving the request from the client that 
it assigns a sequence number, view number and correspond 
authenticator and multicast the PRE_PREPARE message to all 
replicas.
Prepare            A replica broadcast the Prepare message to the rest of replicas after it 
accepts the PRE_PREPARE message.
Commit            Once a replica receive 2f+1 PREPARE message that has the same 
view number and sequence number as the PRE_PREPARE message, 
then it broadcasting the COMMIT message to all replicas including 
the primary. 
A replica commits the corresponding REQUEST after it receives at least 2f 
matching COMMIT messages from other replicas. To prevent a faulty primary that 
intentionally delaying a message, the client starts a timer after it sends out the 
REQUEST message and waits for f+1 responses from different replicas.  Assuming f 
replicas are faulty, at least one response must from a non-faulty replica. If the timer 
expires, the client broadcasts the REQUEST message to all replicas and suspects the 
primary. The rest replicas will then have an election to elect a new primary. In BFT 
algorithm, digital signature or authenticator is employed to ensure the integrity of the 
message, and a cryptographic hash function is used to compute message digests.
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The normal case operation of BFT is illustrated in the Figure 2 below:
Figure 2:  Normal Case Operation of BFT
2.3  Other Byzantine fault tolerant techniques
2.3.1  Paxos
Paxos[26] is a well-known fault-tolerant protocol that allows a set of 
distributed servers, exchanging messages via asynchronous communication, to totally 
order client requests in the benign-fault, crash-recovery model. One server is referred 
as leader who coordination the transaction. If the leader crashes or becomes 
unreachable, a view change occurs, allowing progress to resume in the new view 
under the reign of the new leader. Paxos requires at least 2f+1 server to tolerate f 
faulty servers.  Only one reply is required to be delivered to the client due to the 
servers are not Byzantine.
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In normal case operation, there is a single leader which is used to 
communicate with the rest of servers. Paxos uses two asynchronous communication 
rounds to globally order the client updates. The leader assign a sequence number to 
the client and proposes this assignment to the rest of servers in the first round. In the 
second round, any server agreed on the proposal will send an acknowledgment to the 
rest of servers. When a server receives acknowledgment from the majority of replicas, 
in other word, the majority servers have accepted the proposal – the server orders the 
corresponding update.
2.3.2  Threshold digital signatures
Another well-known fault tolerant protocol is threshold digital signature which 
often be referred as threshold cryptography that distributes trust among a group of 
participants to protect information (e.g. Threshold secret sharing [28]) or computation 
(e.g. Threshold digital signatures [29]).This mechanism is prompted by 
Fragmentation-Replication-Scattering (FRS) which initially designed to provide 
intrusion tolerance for file systems and was later ex-tended to object-based systems. A 
(k, n) threshold digital signature scheme allows a set of servers to generate a digital 
signature as a single logical despite (k-1) Byzantine faults. It divides a private key 
into n shares, each owned by a server, such that any set of k servers can pool their 
shares to generate a valid threshold signature on a message, m, while any set of less 
than k servers is unable to do so. Each server uses its key share to generate a partial 
signature on m and sends the partial signature to a combiner server, which combines 
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the partial signatures into a threshold signature on m. The threshold signature is 
verified using the public key corresponding to the divided private key.
RSA shoup scheme [29], a representative example of practical threshold 
signatures, allows participant to generate threshold signatures based on the standard 
RSA digital signature. It provides verifiable secret sharing (i.e., the ability to confirm 
that a signature share was generated using a valid private key share), which is critical 
in achieving robust signature generation in Byzantine environment.
13
CHAPTER III
BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE  FOR 
NONDETERMINISTIC APPLICATIONS
          
In this chapter, we first, describe the system model of ND-BFT, including its 
operation, communication model and cryptography techniques. Then, we present the 
threat analysis to show the importance of our protocol. After that, we provide a 
systematic classification of replica nondeterminism and illustrate each solution for 
different type of replica nondeterminism.
3.1  System Model
In this section, we present an overview of the system model which will be 
used in following chapters. This model defines the operations provided by the system, 
14
assumptions on node failures and the communications infrastructure, and the 
cryptographic primitives available for use by the ND-BFT protocol.
3.1.1  Operations
ND-BFT provides support for the execution of general operations. These are 
distinct from simple reads and blind writes to services state, as provided by some 
previous protocols. Reads and writes only allow directly reading or overwriting 
objects at the server. General operations, however, allow for the execution of complex 
operations that may depend on current state at the server, and provide a far more 
power interface.
All operations should be deterministic, e.g., given a serialized order over a set 
of operations, each replica should obtain the same result in running each operation, 
provided they have the same application state, which is the purpose of this protocol.
3.1.2  Failure Model
Our system consists of a set C= {c1… ,cn} of client processes and a set R= 
{r1,…,r3f+1} of 3f +1 server processes. Server processes are known as replicas 
throughout this thesis, as they replicate the server application for reliability.
Servers are categorized into either correct server or faulty server. A correct 
process is constrained to obey its specification, and follow the ND-BFT protocol 
precisely. Faulty processes may deviate arbitrarily from their specification: we 
assume a Byzantine failure model where nodes may adopt any malicious or arbitrary 
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behaviors. The difference between fail benignly (fail-stop) and those suffering from 
Byzantine fault is not described in this thesis.
The correct system operation is able to tolerate up to f simultaneously faulty 
replicas. Transient failures are considered to last until a replica is repaired and has 
reestablished a copy of the most recent system state. No guarantees are offered 
beyond failures, and the system may halt or return incorrect responses to client 
operations.
The number of faulty clients is not considered in this thesis.  It is assumed that 
application-level access control is implemented to restrict clients write to modify only 
application state for which they have permission. A malicious client is able to execute 
arbitrary write operations on data it has permission to access, but cannot affect other 
application data nor put the system in an inconsistent state.
3.1.3  Communication Model
The communication model in this thesis is assumed as an asynchronous 
distributed system where nodes are connected by Ethernet. We place very weak safety 
assumptions on this network – it may fail to deliver messages, delay them, duplicate 
them, corrupt them, deliver them out of order, or forward the contents of messages to 
other entities. There are no bounds on message delays, or on the time to process and 
execute operations. We assume that the network is fully connected; given a node 
identifier, any node can attempt to contact the former directly by sending it a message.
For liveness, we require the use of fair links; if a client keeps retransmitting a 
request to a correct server, the reply to that request will eventually be received. 
16
Liveness for the BFT module used by ND-BFT also requires the liveness conditions 
assumed by the BFT protocol. Notably, we assume that message delays do not 
increase exponentially for the lifetime of the system, ensuring that protocol timeouts 
are eventually higher than message delays. These assumptions above are not required 
for liveness that the message delay is not guaranteed based on those assumption.
3.1.4  Cryptography
Our protocol requires highly cryptography to ensure its correctness. Clients 
and replicas must be able to authenticate their communications to prevent forgeries. 
We assume that nodes can use unforgeable digital signatures to authenticate 
messages, using a public key signature schemes such as DSA. We assume a message 
m signed by node n as <m> and no node can send <m>, either directly or as part of 
another message, for any value of m, unless it is repeating a previous message or 
known n’s private key. Any node can verify the integrity of a signature by the 
message m and n’s public key.
We assume that the public keys for each node are known statically by all 
clients and replicas, or available through a trusted key distribution authority. Private 
keys must remain confidential, through the use of a secure cryptographic co-processor 
or otherwise. If the private key of a node is hacked, then the node is considered faulty.
The security of the communication between pairs of nodes, despite message 
transmission on untrusted links, is guaranteed by using Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs). Each pair of node shares a secret session key, established via key 
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exchange using public key cryptography. The notation <m>ux,y is used to describe a 
message authenticated using the symmetric key shared by nodes x and y.
A collision-resistant hash function is assumed in our protocol that that any 
node can compute a digest hm of message m, and it is impossible to find two distinct 
messages m and m’ such that hm=hm’. The hash function is used to avoid sending full 
copies of data in messages for verification purposes, instead using the digest for 
verification.
Our cryptographic assumptions are probabilistic, but there exist signature 
schemes and hash functions for which they are believed to hold with very high 
probability. Therefore, we assume they hold with probability 1.0 in remainder of this 
thesis. To avoid replay attacks, we tag certain messages with nonce that are signed in 
replies. 
3.2  Threat Analysis
This section explains the importance of replica consistency and the necessarily 
to import our protocol to tackle nondeterministic data.
Byzantine fault tolerance system, which based on state machine replications, 
must be deterministic to maintain the consistency of the system [12]. However, 
practical applications always contain some forms of nondeterminism. For example, 
the time-last-modified in a distributed file system is set by reading the server's local 
clock; if this were done in-dependently at each replica, the states of non-faulty 
replicas would diverge.  When such applications are replicated to achieve fault and 
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intrusion tolerance, their nondeterministic behavior must be tackled to ensure the 
replicas consistency or totality.
The most difficult challenging for a software designer to designing a 
distributed application is the consistency of the disseminated information, and the 
control over the dissemination of that information. Therefore, the designer of a 
distributed system would wish for a transport layer that provides a guaranteed 
delivery-and-consistency of messages sent to multiple targets. Have such layer, most 
distributed applications become much easier to implement and maintain. Thus, the 
problem of consistency has received considerable attention when designing a 
distributed system. MIT-BFT framework [18] strongly relies on the total ordering of 
the message passed by each replica during its three phases. The total ordering of 
messages requires a consensus decision. Without the guarantee of the consistency of 
message in MIT-BFT framework, each replica might receives different request 
command at the same phrase that the system would have conflicting operations which 
may cause the crash of the entire system. 
3.3  Type of Replica Nondeterminism
In the Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm [18] only one type of replica 
nondeterminism behavior has been recognized. In this section, we analysis different 
replica nondeterminism and classify them into three categories. Furthermore, we 
mainly focus on two types of replica nondeterminism and divide them into four types 
in order for us to build model to tackle their replica nondeterminism.
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 Wrappable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism that can be 
simply controlled by an infrastructure-provided or application-provided 
wrapper function, without explicit inter-replica coordination. For instance, 
information such as hostnames, process ids, file descriptors, etc. can be 
determined group-wise. Another situation is when all replicas are 
implemented according to the same abstract specification, in which case, a 
wrapper function can be used to translate between the local state and the 
group-wise abstract state, as described in [19].
 Per-determinable non-determinism.  A type of replica nondeterminism 
whose value can be known before the execution of the request and it 
requires inter-replica coordination to ensure replica consistency.
 Post-determinable non-determinism. A type of replica nondeterminism 
whose values can only be recorded after the request is submitted for 
execution and the nondeterministic values won’t be completed until the end 
of the execution. It also requires inter-replica coordination to ensure replica 
consistency.
In this thesis, we merely focus on last two type of replicas nondeterminism 
since the wrappable replica non-determinism has been fully studied by [19] and can 
be tackled by wrapper function without inter replica coordination.
We further classify the replica nondeterminism into two following types based 
on whether a replica can verify the nondeterministic values proposed (or recorded) by 
another replica.
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 Verifiable non-determinism. This type of replica nondeterminism whose 
values can be verified by other replicas.
 Non-verifiable non-determinism. This type of replica non-determinism whose 
values can not be fully verified by other replicas which means a replica might 
be able to partially verify some nondeterminism values proposed by another 
replica. This feature would help to reduce the impact of a faulty replica.
In order to implement current application or to develop new application to 
efficiently handle each type of replica nondeterminism, we classification gives fours 
types of replica nondeterminism of our interests:
 Verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism (VPRE).  Previous study treated 
clock-related operations as this type of operation. However, strictly speaking, 
it is not possible for a replica to verify deterministically another replica's 
proposal for the current clock value without imposing stronger restriction on 
the synchrony of the distributed system (i.g., bounds on message propagation 
and request execution). 
 Non-verifiable per-determinable non-determinism (NPRE). This type of non-
determinism is exhibited as on-line gaming applications, such as Blackjack 
and Texas Hold'em. These application requires highly randomness to ensure 
the integrity of services [4], for instance, the card distributed to each player 
must be unpredictable. Such application depends on the use of good secure 
random number generators. For the security proposes, it is essential to make 
one's choice of a random number unpredictable, let alone verifiable by other 
replicas.
21
 Verifiable post-determinable non-determinism (VPOST). We have yet to 
identify a commonly used application that exhibits this type of non-
determinism. We include this type for completeness.
 Non-verifiable post-determinable non-determinism (NPOST). This type of 
non-determinism is exhibited, in general, in all multi-threaded applications. 
Ideally, the replicas should collectively determine the set of nondeterministic 
values to prevent a single faulty replica from compromising the integrity of 
other replicas [10]. However, it is not clear if it is always feasible for replicas 
to apply a deterministic algorithm to decide on a common set of values from 
those reported by individual replicas, in case of multi-threading. Furthermore, 
it would require a test execution of every request at every replica, which might 
be too expensive to be practical. Therefore, our current solution is to reply on 
the information reported by a single replica (i.e., the primary replica) and to 
employ additional recovery mechanisms to minimize the impact of faulty of 
replica.
3.4  Solution for each type of replica non-determinism
In this section, we present the extensions of current BFT framework in 
handling all common types of replica nondeterminism. The unified framework 
requires closely coordination between BFT algorithm and the application be 
replicated. Comparing with the APIs used in BFT framework [18], the following 
server upcalls (i.e., callback functions registered by the server application) are 
modified:
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Replica upcalls:
int propose_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req *req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer 
*ndet);
Here seqno is the sequence number assigned to the client's REQUEST, req is 
request message, ndet_type is the type of replica nondeterminism when executing 
client's REQUEST, and ndet is a pointer to the buffer that stores the nondeterministic 
values. This function returns appropriate values to indicate if the call successful. Both 
ndet_type and ndet are out-parameters, which mean the application is expected to set 
their values.
Check replica non-determinism:
int check_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req *req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer 
*ndet)
This function is used to check the type of replica nondeterminism, which is 
invoked when a replica want to verify the type of replica nondeterminism and the 
nondeterministic values received from the primary. The parameters in this function 
are the same as those in propose_value() function. The different between two function 
is the parameters ndet_type and ndet in this function are in-parameters, which means 
the information is passed to the application. The verification result is returned to the 
caller in the return value.
Replica execute:
int execute(Byz_req *req, Byz_rep *rep, Byz_vuffer *ndet, int cid, bool ro)
In execute() function the signature is not modified, but the interpretation of 
one of its parameters is changed. Parameter req is REQUEST message, rep is REPLY 
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message to be generated by the replica, ndet is originally defined as a pointer to the 
nondeterministic values obtained from the primary replica and to be used by all 
replicas, i.e., it is intended to be used as in-parameter. It is not reinterpreted as an in-
out parameter which is depending on the type of replica non-determinism, for 
instance, the parameter might be changed from in-parameter to out-parameter when a 
replica has post-determinable nondeterminism and the function is invoked at the 
primary replica.
Figure 3: System Architecture
The replica nondeterminism we classified in previous section are defined in 
the form of four constant integer values as below:
 VERIFIABLE_PRE_DETERMINABLE
 NONVERIFIABLE_PRE_DETERMINABLE
 VERIFIABLE_POST_DETERMINABLE
 NONVERIFIABLE_POST_DETERMINABLE
The BFT algorithm is modified in following ways: when the client's 
REQUEST arrives at the primary, if it is ready to order the message (when the 
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number of ordered but not-yet executed message is smaller than the window 
threshold), the primary invokes the propose_value() callback function registered by 
the application layer. The application supplies the type of replica nondeterminism that 
would be involved in the execution of the request, and if applicable, the 
nondeterministic values. Depending on the type of replica nondeterminism returned 
by the application, the modified BFT algorithm operates differently according to the 
mechanisms described from section 3.4.1 through section 3.4.4.
We introduce two extra-phases: PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE, a phase before the 
PREPARE and POST-COMMIT phase, a phase after COMMIT phase into the new 
algorithm to handle replica nondeterminism in the modified BFT algorithm. We 
introduce two new types of control message, PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message 
and POST_COMMIT message accordingly. The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message 
is used in PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase for the replicas to reach the Byzantine 
agreement on the collection of the nondeterministic values contributed by different 
replicas when non-verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism is present. The 
POST_COMMIT message is used in POST-COMMIT phase for the replicas to reach 
athe Byzantine agreement on the nondeterministic values recorded by the primary 
after it has executed a REQUEST message when post-determinable non-determinism 
is present.
3.4.1  Verifiable Pre-determinable Non-determinism(VPRE)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is VPRE, the primary calls 
propose_value() function in its ndet parameter to propose the nondeterministic types 
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and values. Then it includes the nondeterministic information into the 
PRE_PREPARE message, and multicast the message to all replicas. 
When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it calls check_value() 
function to pass the nondeterministic information to upper layer. Then it verifies the 
following information:
 The type of replica nondeterminism for the client's REQUEST is consistent 
with what is reported by the primary replica.
 The nondeterministic values proposed by the primary is consistent with its 
own values(not necessarily identical)
If the verification succeed, the replica will verify the nondeterminism type and 
value proposed by the primary. After that, it accepts the REQUEST and the ordering 
information, and it logs the PRE_PREPARE message and multi cast PREPARE 
message to all other replicas. The following steps work the same as the original BFT 
framework. On the other hand, if the verification fails, the replica will receive an error 
code returned by check_value() function. The replica will then suspect the primary. 
We illustrate the normal case operation in handling VPRE in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Solution to handle Verifiable Pre-Determinable Non-determinism
3.4.2  Non-Verifiable Pre-determinable Non-determinism(NPRE)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is NPRE, that the replica 
cannot verify other replicas' nondeterministic value for this type of nondeterminism, 
consequently, the propose_value() function is called by the primary to propose its 
share of nondeterministic values in ndet parameter. The nondeterministic information 
is included in PRE_PREPARE message and the primary multicasts the message to all 
replicas.
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When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it verifies the 
REQUEST message and ordering information from the primary. Since for this type of 
replica nondeterminism, the replica is not able to verify other replicas' 
nondeterministic value, the replica, for this type of replica nondeterminism, will only 
verify the nondeterministic type if the verification of REQUEST and ordering 
information is succeed. After the verification of the nondeterministic value in 
PRE_PREPARE message, the replica enters into PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE phase 
by building and sending the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message 
<PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE, v, n, d, t, b> to the primary, where v indicates the view 
number in which the message is being sent, n is the sequence number, d is the request 
message's digest, t is type of replica nondeterminism, and b is the value of replica 
nondeterminism.
After the primary collect at least 2f valid PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message 
from different replica, it start to build PREPARE message, including 2f+1 (including 
the primary itself) sets of nondeterministic values, each message is protected by the 
proposer's digital signature or authenticator. The following steps operate according to 
the original BFT model, except that the PREPARE and COMMIT message also carry 
the digest of the nondeterministic values, and the 2f+1 set of nondeterministic values 
are delivered to the application layer as part of the execute() call. We illustrate the 
normal case operation in handling NPRE in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Solution to handle Non-Verifiable Pre-Determinable Nondeterminism 
While we have described the mechanism to be used to handle this type of 
replica nondeterminism, it is necessarily for us to further discuss the type of 
applications that exhibit such replica nondeterminism and how our mechanism can be 
used to improve the security and dependability of such applications.
For applications such as online poker games [4], the source of replica 
nondeterminism is the most crucial state that should be protected since such values 
are used as the seeds for the pseudo-random number generator to generate a random 
number for the operations, such as shuffling cards. Such application replies on highly 
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randomness of their values to maintain the integrity of the system. The process of 
retrieving such nondeterministic values is often referred as entropy gathering (entropy 
is defined as a measurement of the randomness of the data). The value can be 
obtained either from hardware device, such as Geiger counter that counts the number 
of radioactive decays detected, or using software solution, such as through sampling 
keyboard or mouse events in a computer[14]. On the other hand, if such values are not 
obtained from a high-entropy source, they might be predictable since the pseudo 
random number generator is not truly random [14], and once seed is known, 
consequently the output data from random number generator would also be known. In 
practical, if the server of online poker game is compromised, and the seed which used 
to generate the random number, or in another word the seed used to shuffle the cards 
would be discovered by the person who hacked into the server. And he/she would be 
able to cheat in the game.
Here we assume that a faulty replica cannot transmit the confidential state to 
its colluding clients in real time. This can be achieved by using an application-level 
gateway, or a privacy firewall as described by Yin [3], to block illegal replies. A 
compromised replica may, however, replace a high entropy source to which it 
retrieves the nondeterministic values with a deterministic algorithm, and convey such 
algorithm via out-of-band covert channels to its colluding clients.
To counter such threats, such applications must be replicated using Byzantine 
fault tolerant algorithm. Furthermore, each replica uses different methodology to 
generate its nondeterministic values. In which case, a replica is in no position to verify 
the non-deterministic values proposed by another replica. Ideally, a replica should not 
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even know how other replicas generate their nondeterministic values, let alone to 
verify them.
For each operation that requires nondeterministic input, the replicas should 
collectively determine the input by applying the mechanism described in this section 
which is essential in the entire operation, because otherwise, a single replica might be 
able to compromise the whole service (despite the fact that there are at least 3f+1 
replicas employed), which would jeopardize the intent of applying Byzantine fault 
tolerance to such applications.
3.4.3  Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism(VPOST)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at primary is VPOST that the 
nondeterministic value cannot be known before the execution of the request, the 
primary, under this circumstance, only includes the nondeterministic type in the 
PRE_PREPARE message without enclose any nondeterministic values. Then, the 
primary multicasts the message to all replicas.
When the replica receives the PRE_PREPARE message, it verifies the 
REQUEST message and the ordering information. If the verification succeed, the 
replica will confirm the nondeterministic type associated with the REQUEST 
message. The protocol then proceed to the COMMIT phase as usual. Otherwise, the 
replica suspect the primary. 
On receiving the returned parameters, it enters POST-COMMIT phase by 
building POST_COMMIT message< <POST_COMMIT, v, n, d, t, b>,m>, where m is 
the REQUEST message from client, b is the post-determined non-deterministic 
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values, d is the digest of the REPLY. The primary, first, stores the in-formation into 
the postnd log, and then it multicast the message to all replicas and sends the REPLY 
message back to the client. 
  The replica will deliver REQUEST message if the Byzantine agreement on the 
nondeterministic values for the REQUEST has been reached. If fail to reach the agreement, 
or the verification of nondeterministic value is incorrect, the replica will suspect the 
primary. Furthermore, the replica will suspect the primary if the REPLY does not match 
with the REPLY's digest from the primary. However, despite the result of the comparison, 
the replica produces the same REPLY using the same set of nondeterministic values. The 
detailed processes describe as follow: when the replica receives the POST_ COMMIT 
message from the primary, it checks the received nondeterministic values through the 
check_value() upcall. If the verification succeed, the replica re-multicasts the 
POST_COMMIT message with its own signature or authenticator to the rest of the 
replicas. Otherwise, the replica suspects the primary. When a replica receives at least 2f 
POST_COMMIT messages, which its nondeterministic values matches with other 
replicas', it delivers the REQUEST message through the execute() upcall together with the 
verified non-deterministic values. The replica then sends the REPLY to the client while the 
execute() call returns.
A POST-COMMIT phase is required for the primary to disseminate the 
information in the postnd log to duplicate the information and for all correct replicas 
to ensure that they have received the same set of values for the corresponding 
REQUEST. Unlike the PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase for controlling NPRE, the 
POST-COMMIT phase involves with the entire steps needed for correct replicas to 
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reach the Byzantine agreement on the nondeterministic values. It requires three 
rounds of message exchange similar to those used to determine the ordering of the 
requests under normal case operations. For NPRE, the PREPARE and COMMIT 
phase are needed for the correct replicas to reach byzantine agreement on the 
nondeterministic values. The nondeterministic values are integrated into the 
corresponding request message. Due to the ordering information for the corresponding 
request has already been decided, we could not do so for post-determinable 
nondeterminism. We illustrate the normal case operation in handling VPOST in 
Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Solution to handle Verifiable Post-determinable Nondeterminism
3.4.4  Non-Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism(NPOST)
If the type of replica nondeterminism at the primary is NPOST, the way to 
handle such replica nondeterminism involves with the similar step as the way to 
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handle VPOST as those described in previous section until the replica deliver the 
REQUEST with post-determined nondeterministic values, as shown in Figure 6.
When the primary invokes the execute() upcalls and receives the REPLY and 
non-deterministic values. It enters the POST-COMMIT phase by sending the REPLY 
to the client. And then, it builds and multicast a POST_COMMIT message with 
following information:
 The identity information for the REQUEST message such as the sequence 
number assigned to the message, the view number, and the digest of the 
message.
 The recorded nondeterministic values.
 The digest of the REPLY message.
When replica receives the POST_COMMIT messages, it verifies the 
REQUEST information and re-multicast the message with its own signature or 
authenticator to all replicas. Until the replica has collected at least 2f 
POST_COMMIT messages which match with nondeterministic values from other 
replicas, it prepares for the execution of the REQUEST message.
We must realize that a malicious primary may cause the confusion of the 
replicas or block them from providing useful services to corresponding clients by 
disseminating a wrong set of nondeterministic values. For instance, if the 
nondeterministic data contains thread ordering information, a malicious primary can 
arrange the ordering in such a way that it may lead to the crash of the replicas (e.g., if 
the primary knows the existence of a software bug that leads to a segmentation fault), 
or it may cause a deadlock at the replica (it is possible for a replica to perform a 
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deadlock analysis before it follows the primary's ordering to prevent this from 
happening).
Since in general the replica cannot completely verify the correctness of the 
nondeterministic values until it actually executes the request, it is important for a 
replica to launch a separate monitoring process before invoking the execute() call. If 
the replica runs into a deadlock or a crash failure, the monitoring process can restart 
the replica and suspect the primary.
If the replica can successfully complete the execute() upcall, it compares the 
digest of its own REPLY message with that received from the primary. If those two 
do not match, the replica suspects the primary. Regardless of the comparison result, 
the replica sends the REPLY message to the client. It is safe to do so because if all 
correct replicas produce the similar REPLY using the same set of nondeterministic 
values(even if they might be different with the set actually used by the primary 
replica, which implies that the primary is lying and suspicious), the result is valid.
A good example of this type of replica non-determinism is that of multi-
threaded applications [13]. When such applications are replicated, we must ensure 
different threads access the shared data in the same order, otherwise, the state of 
different replicas may diverge. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of multi-
threaded applications, it is virtually impossible to pre-impose an access ordering 
before the execution of a REQUEST. The only practical solution appears to be 
executing a REQUEST at one replica, recording the access ordering of threads on 
shared data, and propagating the ordering information to other replicas so that they 
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follow the same thread ordering, as described above. We illustrate the normal case 
operation in handling NPOST in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Solution to handle Non-Verifiable Post-determinable Non-determinism
3.5  Proof of Correctness
In this section we provide a proof of correctness of our mechanisms.
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Theorem 1: If a correct replica delivers a  REQUEST m with a set 
of nondeterministic data in view v, then no other correct replica 
delivers m with a different set of nondeterministic data, and all such 
correct replicas use, or record (at the primary), the same set of 
nondeterministic data during its execution for m.
For VPRE, the primary replica proposes the nondeterministic data which 
combine with the agreement on it is carried out together with the REQUEST. At the 
end of the three-phase BFT algorithm, if some correct replicas agree on the ordering 
of the REQUEST, they reach an agreement on the nondeterministic data as well. For 
NPRE, the nondeterministic information is determined by the PRE-PREPARE-
UPDATE phase, and it is followed by three phase BFT algorithm. The correct replica 
commits both the REQUEST m itself and reach the agreement on the associated 
nondeterministic data. For both VPRE and NPRE, when the REQUEST m is 
delivered at a correct replica, the non-deterministic data have been agree-upon are 
also delivered and used for execution.
For VPOST and NPOST, the three-phase BFT algorithm agrees on the non-
deterministic data among correct replicas during the POST-COMMIT phase. When a 
correct replica receives the REQUEST m, it also receives the nondeterministic data 
accompanied with m. A correct primary must log the nondeterministic data during the 
execution of m, and have disseminated the data to replicas during POST-COMMIT 
phase. Therefore, the same nondeterministic data are used for execution at the correct 
client and other correct replicas.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION
4.1  Implementation
Our Byzantine fault tolerance for nondeterministicmapplication framework is 
built by implementing MIT-BFT framework. Th open-source library from MIT. We 
referred our implemented library as ND-BFT. And ourThe framework itself is 
composed as a generic prog library with a simply interface. Section 4.1 describes the 
library's implementation implementation of ND-BFTpresents its interface. To test our 
ND-BFT library in real world application and for future research purposes, we 
developed a poker game and used our imphe poker game with our ND-BFT library, 
which described in section 4.3.
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4.1.1  Library
ND-BFT library uses a connection model of communication. The 
communication among each node is implemented using TCP, and multicast to the 
group of replicas is implemented using TCP over IP multicast. The IP multicast group 
contains all replicas while clients are not members of the multicast group. Replicas 
and clients are structured as a set of handlers that containing a handler for each 
message type and a handler for each timer. The handling loop works as following: 
Replicas and clients wait in a select call for a message to arrive or for a timer deadline 
to be reached and then they call the appropriate handler. The handler performs 
computations similar to the correspond action in the formalization, and then it invokes 
any methods corresponding to internal actions whose pre-conditions become true.
The SFS cryptography library is used to implement the public-key crypto-
system with a 1024-bit modulus to establish 128-bit session keys. All messages are 
authenticated using message authentication codes computed using these keys and 
UMAC32. Message digests are computed using MD5.
For our new protocol, the public-key cryptography encryption and decryption 
are implemented to sign and verify the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE and 
POST_COMMIT messages. These signatures are non-existentially forgeable even 
with an adaptive chosen message attack. MD5 still provide adequate security and it 
can be replaced easily by more secure hash function at the expense of some 
performance degradation. 
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In previous section we described our protocol messages at a logical level 
without specifying the size and layout of the different fields. While it is premature to 
specify the detailed format of protocol messages without further experimentation, but 
to understand the performance results in the next two chapters, it is important to 
describe the format of PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE and POST-COMMIT, we also 
describe the format of REQUEST and REPLY message in Figure 8 for the better 
understand of the normal case operation. 
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Figure 8: Message Format
The REQUEST header includes a MD5 digest of the string obtained by 
combined by the client identifier, cid, the REQUEST identifier, rid, and the operation 
being requested, op. It also includes the identifier of the designated replier. The flags 
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in the REQUEST header indicates whether to use the read-only optimization and 
whether the REQUEST contains a signature or an authenticator. In the normal case, 
all requests contain authenticators. In addition to the header, the REQUEST message 
includes a variable size payload and an authenticator. In the normal case, all 
REQUEST messages contain authenticators. The authenticator is composed of a 64-
bit nonce, and n 64-bit UMAC32 tags that authenticate the REQUEST header. When 
a replica receives a REQUEST, it checks if the corresponding MAC in the 
authenticator and the digest in the header are correct.
The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE message is assigned by the replicas when 
encounter VPRE. The PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE header is composed of a view 
number v,  a sequence number n and an MD5 digest d of the 
PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE payload, the REQUEST message’s id, a buffer that can 
be filled with nondeterministic choice, and a number of bytes in the nondeterministic 
values associated with the batch. The following payload includes the type of replica 
nondeterminism. Additionally, the message includes an authenticator with a nonce, 
and n-1 UMAC32 tags that authenticate the PRE_PREPARE_UPDATE header.
The POST_COMMIT message is used to handle VPOST and NPOST. The 
POST_COMMIT header includes the view number v, the sequence number n, MD5 
digest d of the POST_COMMIT payload, the replica's id, choice, ndetsz, and the 
number of bytes in request inlined in the message, ireqsz. The variable size payload 
includes the requests that are inlined, ireqs, and the nondeterministic choices, ndet. 
The message also includes a corresponding authenticator.
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After the replica executes all the operations in the batch, it sends a reply to the 
client. The reply header includes the view number v, the request identifier, rid, and 
MD5 digest d of the operation result, the identifier of the replica, and the size of the 
result in bytes, ressz. Additionally, the reply message contains the operation result if 
the replica is the designated replier. The other replicas omit the result from the 
REPLY message and set the result size in the header to -1. REPLY message contains 
a single UMAC32 nonce and a tag that authenticates the REPLY header. The client 
checks the MAC in the REPLY it receives. Client also checks the result digest in the 
REPLY with the result.
4.1.2  Interface
The algorithm is implemented as a library with a very simple interface which 
invokes some part of the library on client and some part on replicas. 
On the client side, an initialization procedure is provided by library for the 
client using a configuration file, which contains the public keys, the IP address, and 
the port number of the replicas. The library also provides a procedure, invoke(), and 
which is called to execute an operation. The procedure is responsible for the protocol 
in the client side and returns the result when enough replicas have responded. The 
library also provides a split interface with separate send and receives calls to invoke 
requests.
On the server side, we provide an initialization procedure that takes an 
argument: a configuration file with the public keys and IP addresses of replicas and 
clients, the region of memory where the service state is stored, a procedure to execute 
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requests, and a procedure to compute nondeterministic choices. When our system 
needs to execute an operation, it does an upcall to the execute procedure. The 
argument to this procedure includes a buffer with the requested operation and its 
arguments, req, and a buffer to fill with the operation result, rep. The execute 
procedure execute the operation for the service, using the service state. As the service 
performs the operation, each time it is about to modify the service state, it calls the 
modify procedure to inform the library of the locations about to be modified. When 
the primary receives a request, it selects a non-deterministic value for the request by 
making an upcall to the nondet procedure. The nondeterministic choice associated 
with a REQUEST is also passed as an argument to the execute upcall.
4.1.3  Online Poker Game
We implement one online poker game, very familiar as Texas Holdem poker 
game, a client/server based web application which supports multi-player network 
players, and the ND-BFT library is installed on the server side. The type of replica 
nondeterminism for this application is VPRE Figure 9 shows the architecture of this 
game, as we have described in previous chapter. Because the purpose of creating this 
game is merely to test the performance of our library that running under a practical 
system, this game do not have complex GUI or structure that would slow down the 
system performance. Figure 9 shows the architecture of this game.
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Figure 9: Architecture of online poker game with ND-BFT library
          
The normal operation of our game runs as the following: 
On the client side, the client, first, establish a connection to the servers. And 
then, according to the pre-configured configuration file, which defines the number of 
player. For instance, if the number is 4, so if four clients connect to the servers, then 
the game starts. Each player in the game sends the request to invoke the shuffling 
function in server, and waiting for the reply from server. The player will pick the 
majority reply from servers to make a final decision.
On the server side, each server initiate according to the configuration file 
which also containing the IP address and port number, and then it waiting for enough 
player to join the game. On noticed there are enough players, the server piggybacks 
the acknowledgment information to client and waiting for client's request. On 
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receiving the request, the server invokes the shuffling function which triggers the ND-
BFT library to handle the nondeterministic values. The execution of the clients' 
request will be used to seed the random number generator to generate a random 
number, and the output of the random number will modules by 52 to have a 
corresponded number as a poker card to the player. 
4.2  Performance Evaluation
The BFT library can be used to implement Byzantine-fault-tolerant systems 
but these systems will not used in practice unless they perform well. This section 
presents results of experiments to evaluate the performance of these systems. These 
results show that these two extra phases we introduced in order to handle replica 
nondeterminism under different circumstances do not degrade performance 
significantly.
The experiments were performed using the setup in section 4.2.1. We describe 
experiments to measure the value. Section 4.2.2 use benchmarks to evaluate the 
performance during the normal case without checkpoint management, view changes 
or recovery. 
We implemented the core mechanisms in C++ and integrated them into the 
BFT framework. The experiments described below are focused on the evaluation of 
the cost for providing Byzantine fault tolerance to nondeterministic applications in the 
BFT layer. The cost associated with recording nondeterministic values, verifying such 
values, and replaying such values in the application layer is not studied in this work.
47
4.2.1  Experimental Setup
The experiment consists of 14 nodes running RedHat 8.0 Linux. Of the 14 
computers, 4 of them are equipped with Pentium-4 2.8GHz processors and the rest of 
those computers have Pentium-3 1GHz processors. The computers are connected via a 
16-port Netgear 100Mbps switch. The replicas run on Pentium-4 nodes and clients are 
distributed across the rest of nodes.
4.2.2  Normal Case Operation
The experiment involves end-to-end latency and throughput measurements for 
client-server application under normal operations for different types of replica non-
determinism, including composite types. Because of the experiments limitation, we 
only enable 4 replicas to take care a single Byzantine fault. The rest of the servers act 
as clients, and one server can be used as several clients with different port number. In 
each iteration, each client issues a request to the server replicas and waits for the 
corresponding reply. There is no waiting time between consecutive iterations. The 
size of each request and reply are kept fixed at 1KB. In each run, we measure the total 
elapsed time for 10,000 consecutive iterations at each client. From the measured time, 
we derive the average end-to-end latency for each of the request-reply iteration and 
the system throughput.
Figure 10 and 11 shows the end-to-end latency performance testing of our 
library under the normal case operation with different type of replica nondeterminism. 
Figure 10 shows the result of single type of replica nondeterminism which means the 
replica only containing one type of replica nondeterminism including VPRE, VPOST, 
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NPRE and NPOST. Figure 11 shows the result of composition type of replica 
nondeterminism that the replica containing two types of replica nondeterminism. With 
the increasing complexity construction of real-world applications, they could have 
more than one type of replica nondeterminism. In our experiment we only consider 
the applications involving two type of replica nondeterminism. The composited type 
of replica nondeterminism in our experiment includes VPRE+NPRE, VPRE+VPOST, 
VPRE+NPOST, NPRE+VPOST, NPRE+NPOST and VPOST+NPOST.
Figure 10: End-to-End Latency of Pure Nondeterminism 
The type of replica nondeterminism and the size of nondeterministic values 
vary in different experiments, except for the throughput measurements, where the 
non-deterministic values are kept at 256 Bytes for each type. Note that log the 
nondeterministic values shown in the horizontal axis in Figure are for each type. That 
means, for composite types, the total size of nondeterministic value is twice times as 
large as those displayed.
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Obviously, we can see from the previous figures that the latency of VPRE 
non-deterministic operation is noticeably smaller than that of other three 
nondeterministic operations. That is because except for VPRE, the handling of other 
types of non-determinism involves with one more phases of message exchanges for 
correct replicas to reach an agreement on the nondeterministic values. As such, as 
shown in Figure 9, the end-to-end latency is noticeably larger, and the throughput is 
smaller, compared with that of VPRE nondeterministic operations. The end-to-end 
latency difference is more significant as the size of nondeterministic values involved 
with each operation increases. Since our system deploys a lightweight fault-tolerant 
protocol, we expect it to achieve performance comparable to existing byzantine fault-
tolerant replication protocol. We compare the throughput performance of original 
protocol where the replicas are deterministic with replica with different type of 
nondeterministic value. From the comparison, we can see that the throughput for 
deterministic replica is slightly higher than our system that handling different type of 
replica nondeterminism, which is acceptable due to the complexity of our 
mechanisms.
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Figure 11:  End-to-End Latency of Composite Nondeterminism
The results shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 are obtained after a number of 
optimizations to the mechanisms described previously. Without these optimizations, 
the latency is significantly larger and the throughput is much lower, except for those 
from VPRE nondeterministic operations.
In the PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE phase, which is needed to handle NPRE and 
other composite types involving with NPRE, each replica multicasts its contribution 
of the nondeterministic values to all other replicas, and the primary decides on the 
collection (must include the contributions from 2f+1 replicas, including its own) to be 
used to calculate the final nondeterministic values. Instead of multicasting the 
collection of nondeterministic values, the primary disseminates the collection of the 
digests of the values proposed by each replica. This sharply reduces the message size 
if the size of nondeterministic values is large. Since each replica can log the 
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nondeterministic values received from other replicas, a replica can verify the digests 
provided by the primary replica using its local copies. A replica might not have 
received the values proposed by one or more replicas included in the primary’s 
message, in which case, the replica asks for retransmission of the values.
During the POST-COMMIT phase, which is needed to handle NPOST non-
determinism, the data in the postn log is piggybacked with the PRE_PREPARE 
message for the next REQUEST. This way, the Byzantine agreement for the 
nondeterministic values is reached together with that for the ordering of that 
REQUEST, which reduces the number of messages needed to handle this type of 
replica nondeterminism. Even though the end-to-end latency for a REQUEST 
increases slightly as a restem throughput is significantly improved. To avoid waiting 
indefinitely for the next REQUEST, the primary sets a timer. When the timer expires, 
the primary initiates the Byzantine agreement phases for the nondeterministic values 
in conjunction with a null REQUEST so that the existing mechanisms can be reused.
It may be surprising to see that the end-to-end latency for a REQUEST with 
NPRE is similar to, or slightly larger than, that for a request with NPOST when there 
are large quantity of nondeterministic values. With the above optimization, the PRE-
PREPARE-UPDATE phase involves with at least two large messages (one message 
per replica on its proposed nondeterministic values) while the POST-COMMIT phase 
(needed to handle NPOST) involves with only one large message (sent by the 
primary). Due to the same reason, the throughput for requests with NPOST is higher 
for those with NPRE when  enough concurrent clients are present (so that virtually all 
52
post-determinable nondeterministic values are piggybacked with the PRE_PREPARE 
messages for other requests, rather than being sent as separate messages).
Figure 12 shows the result of throughput performance for pure replica non-
determinism. And accordingly Figure 13 shows the throughput for composite replica 
nondeterminism.
Figure 12:  Throughput of Pure Nondeterminism
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Figure 13: Throughput of Composite Nondeterminism
4.2.3  Online Poker Game
To demonstrate ND-BFT’s performance on real application, we conducted the 
experiments for our online poker game replicated with ND-BFT library. The 
programming language we used to develop the online poker game is Java. We use JNI 
(Java Native Interface) technique to connect the online poker game with ND-BFT 
library. The experiments include throughput measurement with different number of 
players. We run the experiments using the same network environment as the 
experiment for ND-BFT library. For players who request to the replica will only issue 
one request to the replica to invoke the shuffling function to shuffle the card. On 
receiving the command from the player, each replica runs 1,000 consecutive iterations 
for the card shuffling. There are no waiting times for the players. We measure the 
system throughput by calculating the elapse time. We analyze the performance of 
online poker game without view-changes or proactive recovery. We start by 
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presenting results of experiments that ran with four replicas. We conduct the second 
experiment with seven replicas (may tolerate two faulty replicas).
For comparison purposes, the size of each request and reply still kept at 1KB. 
As we described in previous section, online poker games require a seed to generate a 
random number which always containing NPRE. To exhibit our algorithm could be 
applied on practical applications, we compare the performance between the poker 
game with and without our library; we only wrote code for it to work in the normal 
case. 
Figure 14 present results of the throughput performance comparison between 
the original online poker game and the replicated online poker game, respectively, in 
a configuration with four replicas. The comparison between ND-BFT and NO-REP 
shows that if there are less than four players, the performance of ND-BFT is close to 
the performance of NO-REP. The throughput of ND-BFT increase rapidly when there 
are more than four players in the game. Percentage-wise, the comparison of the 
throughput performance is lowered by 30% to nearly 50%, which indicated that this 
library would be more efficient when running under lightweight environment which 
have a small number of players. 
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Figure 14: Throughput for online poker game (4 replicas)
Figure 15 presents the throughput measured with seven replicas. The average 
throughputs of both mechanisms are lower than the mechanism in previous 
experiment due to the number of replicas is increased. However, it might be 
surprising to find out that the throughput performance for seven replicas ND-BFT are 
very close to the four replicas ND-BFT. This could be helpful information for 
software designers because they can increase the security of their system without 
degrade the performance significantly. As the number of players increased, the 
throughput performance of NO-REP is increased by approximate 10% to 35% higher 
than ND-BFT.
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Figure 15: Throughput for online poker game (7 replicas)
There are two conclusions we gain from the experiment. First, our current 
mechanism would be more appropriate to be applied on the games which have small 
number of players. And there are more optimization works need to be done to 
improve the performance of the mechanism to be able to survive in large game which 
have considerable asynchronous network players. Secondly, the result shows that 
improving the resilience of the system by increasing the number of replica from four 
to seven does not degrade performance significantly.   
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CHAPTER V
RELATED WORKS
          
There is a vast body of research in the areas of fault tolerance and state 
machine replication. We present a brief overview of replication protocols to tolerate 
Byzantine fault for on practical istic applications. Our main focus, however, is on 
handling replica nondeterminism problem for Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine 
replication protocols that provide support for general operations in an asynchronous 
environment.
Replica nondeterminism has been studied extensively under the benign fault 
model. However, there is no systematic classification of the common types of replica 
nondeterminism, therefore less attention has been payed on handling such non-
determinism. [7] did provide a classification of some types of replica nondeterminism. 
However, they largely focused on the types of wrappable nondeterminism and 
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verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism, except for nondeterminism caused by 
asynchronous interrupts, which we do not address in this work.
The replica nondeterminism caused by multithreading has been studied 
separately from other types of nondeterminism, again, under the benign fault mode 
only, in[5, 6, 11, 15]. However, these studies provided valuable insight on how to 
approach the problem of ensuring the consistency of replicated multithreaded 
applications. It is realized that what matters in achieving replica consistency is to 
control the ordering of different threads on access of shared data. The mechanisms to 
record and to replay such ordering have been developed. So do those for 
checkpointing and restoring the state of multi-threaded applications (for 
example,[21]). Even though the se mechanisms alone are not sufficient to achieve 
Byzantine fault tolerance for multithreaded applications, they can be adapted and used 
towards this goal. In this thesis, we have shown when to record and partially verify 
the ordering, how to propagate the ordering, and how to provision for problems 
encountered when replaying the ordering, all under the Byzantine fault model.
Under the Byzantine fault model, the main effort on the subject of replica non-
determinism control so far is to cope with wrappable and verifiable pre-determinable 
replica nondeterminism. In[17, 18], Castro and Liskov provided a brief guideline on 
how to deal with the type of nondeterminism that requires collective determination of 
nondeterministic values. The guide is very important and useful, as we have followed 
in this work. However, the guideline is applicable to only a subset of the problems we 
have addressed.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The growing reliance of our society on computer demands highly-available 
systems that provide correct service without interruptions. Byzantine faults such as 
software bugs, operator mistakes, and malicious attacks are the major cause of service 
interruptions.  Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms have been invented to handle 
Byzantine faults by replicating servers and making them working in the same order. 
Replica nondeterminism, a problem that would disrupt the consistency of replica does 
not be addressed in Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms. Therefore there are no 
appropriate ways to handle such problem which is obtained by the majority of 
practical applications. This issue must be handled to ensure the total ordering of a 
Byzantine fault tolerant system.
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This thesis presented a classification of common types of replica 
nondeterminism, and the mechanisms to handle them in the context of Byzantine fault 
tolerance. We also described how to integrate our mechanisms into a well-known 
BFT framework. Furthermore, we conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the 
performance of the BFT framework extended with our mechanisms and, for the first 
time, replicate a real online application, online poker game with our library-ND-BFT.
This chapter presents a summary of the main results in the thesis and direction 
for future works.
6.1  Summary
This thesis describes ND-BFT, a state-machine replication algorithm that 
based on Byzantine fault tolerant algorithm that handles replica nondeterminism 
problems occurred during the toleration of Byzantine faults.
BFT algorithms highly reply on replica consistency. BFT is the first state-
machine replication algorithm that works correctly in asynchronous systems with 
Byzantine faults, in addition, it guarantees liveness provided message delays are 
bounded eventually, which require all replica execute the operation in the same order. 
It is a bad assumption that all replicas are deterministic, for instance, some services 
are data and time-last-modified which are set by reading the server's local clock, and 
if each server is in different location, the consistency of the whole system would 
diverge. Therefore, the mechanism to handle such behavior is necessary and needed. 
It is also bad to assume that the replica nondeterminism can be treated in the 
same way. In the research of BFT, Castro and Liskvo simply treat the replica 
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nondeterministic problem by having the primary select the nondeterministic value 
independently or based on values provided by the replicas. The mechanism which 
categorized as wrappable nondeterminism and verifiable pre-determinable 
nondeterminism is indeed adequate for some services such as NFS. However, to 
provide our services in all practical application, a systematic categorization of all 
replica nondeterministic behavior is highly desired.
In this thesis, we categorized the replica nondeterministic into four types: 
VPRE, NPRE, VPOST and NPOST. ND-BFT, a generic program library with a 
simple interface, is based on BFT to provide a complete solution to each type of 
replica nondeterminism to the problem of building real services that tolerate 
Byzantine faults. For example, it includes efficient techniques to garbage collection 
information, to transfer state to bring replica up-to-date, to retransmit messages, and 
to handle services with different type of replica nondeterminism. The thesis presents a 
real service that was implemented using the ND-BFT library: the first Byzantine-
fault-tolerant application that could handle complex replica nondeterministic 
problems.
The ND-BFT library and the corresponding ND-BFT application perform 
well. For example, ND-BFT performs only 13% lower throughput than BFT library 
and ND-BFT poker game performs 24% lower throughput than the nonreplicated 
poker game. Considering the ND-BFT could mask nondeterministic software errors, 
which seems to be the most persistent since they are the hardest to detect, the 
performance reduction is really acceptable. In fact, we always encountered such a 
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software bug while running our system. Our algorithm was able to continue running 
correctly in the presence of such kind of failure. 
Additionally, the benefit of our algorithm can be increased by taking steps to 
increase diversity. One possibility is to have the diversity in the execution 
environment: the replicas can be administered by different people; they can be in 
different geographic locations; can they can have different configurations, for 
instance, run schedulers with different parameters or run different combination of 
services, but the ordering of the system is consistent. Thus the service provided by the 
system is reliable and totally ordered.
6.2  Future Work
We want to conduct deeper research that focusing on improve resilience to 
software bugs and online services, since the increasing popularity of those services 
would definitely bring the attention of hackers who wish to take the advantage by 
hacking or sabotaging those services. Not only online gaming application such as 
Blackjack and Texas Hold'em, but also several independent implementations 
available of operating systems and important services (e.g., file systems, databases, 
and web servers), replicas can run different operating system and different 
implementations of the code for these services. It is necessary to implement a small 
software layer for this to work. This could be simplified by the using existing 
protocols to access important services. There are also some research works on how to 
make this layer works more efficiently.
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It is possible to improve security by combining our algorithm with other 
existing Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm. For instance, there are some interesting 
issues on using threshold signature techniques to replace BFT algorithm. The adapted 
BFT algorithm consists of three communication rounds (under normal operation) for 
Byzantine agreement and an additional round run at the beginning for key shares 
distribution. The Byzantine agreement algorithm works similar to the BFT algorithm 
except the third round, where each replica generates a partial signature (using its key 
share) to sign the client’s message and piggyback the partial signature to the Commit 
message. Each replica combines the partial signatures into a threshold signature. The 
signature is then mapped into a number to seed the PRNG. Despite the elegance of the 
threshold signature, the algorithm, however, might not be practical in the Internet 
environment. First of all, it depends on a trusted dealer at the beginning to generate a 
key pair, divide the private key into several key shares and it must also be responsible 
for distributing the key shares to all replicas. If the dealer is compromised, the entire 
system can be easily penetrated by the adversary. Meanwhile, the threshold signature 
is computationally expensive, especially when generating the threshold signature (for 
a 1024-bit threshold signature it usually takes 73.9ms on IBM xSeries 330 1U 
rackmount PC with 1.0GHz Pentium III CPUs, 1.5 GB EEC PC133 SDRAM, and two 
36 GB IBM UltraStar 36LZX hard drives)(Rhea et al., 2003). Furthermore, the validity 
on the use of the threshold signature as the seed to the PRNG remains to be proved 
secure. 
This thesis focused on the performance of the ND-BFT library in the normal 
case. It is important to perform an experimental evaluation of the reliability and 
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performance of our library with faults by using fault-injection techniques. The 
difficulty is that attacks are hard to model. Ultimately, we would like to make a real 
service on Internet and develop the modules and tools to record, verify and replay 
nondeterministic values to evaluate ability of our algorithm. 
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